Introduction
The NAVWAR against GNSS, which has newly emerged in recent years, has not been well known to civilian and the military as well. Therefore, one of the main issues in the NAVWAR, the jamming against the navigation system, has not been well introduced yet. Especially, the systematic mechanism of the jamming, characteristics of jamming procedures, the effectiveness of the jamming might not be consistent due to the lack of open materials and their limitations for security.
As long as NAVWAR is undertaken in a conflict area, a certain level of principles must be required for maintaining the safe security of infrastructures in civilian and the military. This study is focused on the fundamental research prior to the research on "Potential principle of NAVWAR"
under NAVWAR of the future warfare. Because of the restriction of field test, any experimental way is not dealt with in this study.
In the paper, we study the investigation of NAVWAR based on electronic warfare (EW) and the analysis on characteristics of the jamming against GNSS's receivers.
Especially, the characteristics of the denial jamming and the deception jamming on NAVWAR referred to EW are investigated. The fundamental mechanisms for the denial jamming and the deception jamming/spoofing are also
proposed.
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Denial jamming in EW and NAVWAR
The more GNSS is applied to enhance the functional capability of modern weapon systems, the more the threat of Although the terminology used in the jamming of radars and GNSS is slightly different, it has been recognized that the fundamental techniques of the denial jamming are very similar to ones applied to GNSS in process in this study.
The GPS jamming is defined to be the intentional radio frequency interference to cause a GPS receiver to fail to acquire or break lock, and then the useful solutions of navigation can not be obtained. It is referred to the denial jamming as mentioned previously. To perform the jamming, it is essential that the sufficient intentional interference signal must be induced to the receiver, then jammer to receiver signal power ratio power(J/S) should exceed the tracking threshold. It would be discussed in the next.
Deception jamming/spoofing in EW and NAVWAR
The deception jamming, named spoofing in GPS community, has actually been applied to a radar in EW for a long time (USN, 2006; Hong, 2000) . Whereas the denial jamming blocks the location of the target with noise, the deception jamming misleads by providing a false target location. Then radar and command control systems can be confused by causing the radar to generate incorrect target range, bearing and elevation.
In the case of GPS, the satellite signal manipulated by erroneous mechanism must be propagated to the receiver's antenna as if a genuine signal, and then the receiver is naturally to lock the false satellite signals and create undesired errors in positioning, velocity, timing(PVT)(DOT, 2001). As a result, the receiver can be walked off the desired track prior to the discovery of deception. It should also be noted that the deception jamming of GPS is more difficult to perform and more serious in threat than the typical denial jamming.
3. Fundamental mechanism of the GNSS receiver's 
Simplified evaluation flow of GNSS receiver's jamming under NAVWAR
In this section, we would describe the procedure of tracking the jamming signal to organize the systematic mechanism of the GNSS receiver's jamming. The received signal through an antenna contains not only the desired GPS signal, receiver thermal noise but also jamming signal of the denial or the deception/spoofing in jamming circumstances.
The received signal with the denial jamming signal should effect to the sampling and quantizing of the signal, and then its resultant error also effect in the signal processing of the parallel code and carrier tracking loops.
In the normal case without jamming signal, the outputs of the digital processing produces pseudorange, delta range, doppler shift and data demodulation for proceeding the navigation process. The signal acquisition, carrier tracking and data demodulation depend on the amplitude of the signal to noise ratio. In case of the denial jamming, if J/S is over the tolerable value , the lock of signal tracking may be failed, then the denial jamming is successful. However, the deception jamming signal must be locked by the tracking loops in order to produce the false outputs in PVT, then the deception jamming is successful. In order to examine to the jamming effect of the denial jamming, the tolerable jamming signal to received signal power ratio, J/S, has generally been used, however, there is no proper way for evaluating the deception jamming of GNSS yet. The fundamental simplified mechanism GNSS jamming in a victim's receiver is 
Analysis and evaluation of GNSS jamming

Analysis of GNSS jamming characteristics
The most jamming issues are deeply related to the signal characteristics of GNSS's satellites. Although the GNSS jamming has been focused on GPS receiver, it is sure that the circumstance of the jamming will be rapidly changed with the new global navigation satellite systems, GALILEO and COMPASS, and the modernized systems, GPS and GLONASS.
The modernized GPS signal characteristics and the frequency allocation of GNSS are shown in table (1) and (2) One must pay attention to the several remarks on the tables to affect the jamming mechanism. These are the received power, bandwidth and carrier frequency band. Even if some of COMPASS frequencies are not clearly allocated due to the signal interference to GPS and GALILEO, most of carrier frequencies of the future GNSS will be similar ones on the table obtained using the newest materials. 
Evaluation of GNSS jamming
Even though a few conducts of the denial jamming test (Kaplan, 2006) for the modern satellites are here rearranged to compare to the ones that we simply computed with respect to the old fashioned satellite. The calculation was also performed using J/S and the user minimum received power provided in references (Kaplan, 1996) . From the above three tables, we also recognized as follows. The tolerable J/S values of the WB jamming is higher than one of the NB jamming at same signal code, L1
C/A, P(Y) and L1(M), respectively. And the combined GNSS receivers with receiving GPS signal will have not only the wider bandwidth but also the wider carrier frequency in spectrum band than the present single receiver. Therefore, the future jammer against the combined GNSS receivers must require the higher power than the current potential jammers.
Additionally, even though the most of new satellites of GNSS have the stronger power, the minimum received signal power of the future GNSS receivers might still be weak as much as the oder of the pico watt. It is sure that the multiple-low powered, low-cost jamming devices will be a threat against the civilian GNSS receivers.
Conclusion
This study was focused on the fundamental research prior to the designing for "potential principle of NAVWAR"
under NAVWAR in future warfare. In the paper, we have studied on the fundamental mechanisms and characteristics of the intentional electromagnetic interference, jamming against GPS receiver. The characteristics of the denial jamming and the deception jamming on NAVWAR referred to EW have been investigated. The fundamental mechanisms for the denial jamming and the deception jamming/spoofing were proposed. It was also noted that the future combined GNSS receivers with receiving GPS signal will have not only the wider bandwidth but also the wider carrier frequency in spectrum band than the present single receiver.
Therefore, the future jammer against the combined GNSS receivers must require the higher power than the current potential jammers. For the effectiveness GNSS jamming, the tolerable J/S values of the WB jamming and the NB jamming at various same signal codes, L1 C/A, P(Y) and L1(M), were evaluated. The intentional interference to the future GNSS involving GPS must be also the important issue to civilian users in near future. In the future works, we would like to continue to work for designing "The potential principles of NAVWAR" with proper tests.
